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Article 9

DE GUSTIBUS
Robert Matz
Futile Pleasures: Early Modern
Literature and the Limits of Utility
by Corey McEleney. New York:
Fordham University Press, 2018.
Pp. 256. $28.00 paper.

Corey McEleney’s Futile Pleasures
seeks to demonstrate that Renaissance writers who worried about
the frivolity of literature—theater,
poetry, and romance—were right.
Despite their appeals to educational
or moral profit to justify literary
pleasure, these Renaissance literary
texts fail to deliver on their utilitarian promises. Linking contemporary
historicist criticism to Renaissance
authors’ similar wish to redeem literature as useful, McEleney seeks
instead to revive a deconstructive
textuality that emphasizes “play,
digression, deferral, contradiction,
surprise, coincidence, and a general
resistance to ends” (8). He ties the
eclipse of this high deconstructive
mode to its association with “nonheterosexual eroticism and style”
(40), as reflected in charges of “impotency and passivity . . . obliquely figured by the narcissism of women
and queers, gay men in particular”
(41). Critics who insist instead on the
“importance of effecting historical or
political understanding, difference,
or change” (41) replicate Renaissance
scapegoating of queer or other marginalized figures who represent
un(re)productive literary and sexual
pleasures (8, 44).
Playing on the utility of Horace’s
dulce et utile, McEleney calls his
approach “futilitarian.” Granting,
however, that it is difficult to eschew
all forms of usefulness, and perhaps
undesirable to do so (6–7), McEleney
hopes the pleasurable critical journey of Futile Pleasures will excuse its
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inevitable capitulation to the ends of
critical argument (14). This journey
involves—with intentional digression to other texts and authors,
early modern and otherwise—close
readings of five major Renaissance
texts: Richard II, The Schoolmaster,
The Unfortunate Traveler, Book 6
of The Faerie Queene, and Paradise
Lost. Surprisingly absent from the
book is Marlowe, who merits only
three brief mentions. For sheer
Renaissance literary fun, is there
anything that beats “Hero and
Leander”?
The chapter on Richard II
establishes the connection between
futilitarian literary pleasures and a
scapegoated queer character whom
McEleney—borrowing from Lee
Edelman riffing on Lacan—refers
to as the sinthomosexual (47–48).
Here the sinthomosexual is Richard
II, a non-reproductive king who
engages in wasteful and “narcissistic” (48) pleasures (from the
view of the normative political
world) along with his “sodomitical flatterers” Bushy, Bagot, and
Green (58–59). These pleasures
are also literary, a connection made
through the aesthetic dimension of
the myth of Narcissus and through
the epithet “caterpillars of the commonwealth,” used both to describe
Richard’s followers and, in Stephen
Gosson’s The Schoole of Abuse,
poets and players, among others
(pipers, as usual in these discussions, get short shrift). McEleney
argues that Richard becomes the

scapegoat for the pleasures of
the text: “the play projects vanity
onto its eponymous character so
as to avoid the futilitarian void in
which he falls” (51). By finally providing a counter figure of redemption in Hal, Shakespeare further
submits the narrative arc of the
second tetralogy to “the ideology
of socially useful ends” (63).
The following chapter shifts
from theater to another suspect
Renaissance literary form, the
romance. A nice deconstructive
reading of Roger Ascham’s The
Schoolmaster traces how his condemnation of the idle and indecent pleasures of Arthurian tales
replicates, in its search for the enemies of morality, a romance quest,
with the “protean foe always just
beyond his grasp” (79). McEleney
in this chapter joins Ascham with
Nashe, an unlikely pair except that
Nashe too, however ironically, at
times rails against pleasures of
romance or Italianate literature
and culture. There is a sharp reading here of the phrase “babble
bookemungers” in the Anatomie
of Absurditie (82–85). McEleney’s
attempt to discover Nashe’s inability in The Unfortunate Traveler to
reconcile pleasure and profit (“a
radically incompatible doubling
between the pleasurable means
and apparently virtuous ends of
the text” [97]) seems to me to take
Nashe’s occasional expressions
of seriousness too seriously in the
first place.

	ON FUTILE PLEASURES
In the second half of the book,
McEleney turns to two writers,
Spenser and Milton, who did take
seriously the idea that literary pleasure could provide a useful moral
education. In the chapter on Book
6 of the Faerie Queene, McEleney
emphasizes, as other critics before
him, the ways in which the particularly interrupted and unfinished plots of Book 6 give the lie to
any notion of ends-oriented literary value. Like Calidore, Spenser
abandons the quest. Or rather, such
is the nature of literary writing, and
pleasure, that Spenser finds himself
unable to straighten out its twists
and turns (especially 109, 115).
Speaking tropologically, writing,
romance in particular, is perverse.
If the perverse power of the
trope is the subject of McEleney’s
chapter on The Faerie Queene,
the failed effort to sublimate literary materials into spiritual goods
is the subject of the chapter on
Paradise Lost. In what I find the
most ambitious chapter of the
book, McEleney argues that Milton
seeks to purge the literary of all
that is base, including remnants of
Elizabethan romance and ornamental language. Or rather, he
seeks to sublimate them, like an
alchemist transmutes base metal
into gold. This process of sublimation is also a desire for sublimity, for
an airy, mountain view from which
one can stand above the dross of
history. Yet, McEleney observes,
Milton is as constantly aware of
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the vain pride in soaring too high
as he is of the inevitable residue
of creation, the “black tartareous
cold infernal dregs” (Paradise Lost
7.238) that cannot be sublimed
away. The sinthomosexual figure
for this fall from heights to dregs
is Satan, in whose Hell the hill is
(as described by McEleney by way
of some imagery from Bataille) an
anus/volcano, unpredictably belching unsublimated ore (159–60).
McEleney concludes: “The real
task, then, is to theorize a critical
space wherein that or(e) is taken
differently into account, viewed
not simply as abjected refuse but
as a source of queer pleasure and as
the undesired end, in every sense of
the word ‘end,’ of the salvational,
redemptive, and generative desires
we foist onto poetry” (160).
The book’s coda reflects in
turn on the ends of “futilitarian”
criticism. Can such a criticism
have an end, without betraying its
commitment to nonpurposive activity? McEleney tentatively answers
that that criticism can seek to be
more like the literary, in order to
“reconceive scholarly and critical
writing to make more room for the
idle, pointless and playful pleasures that early modern writers,
not unlike their postmodern heirs,
half-heartedly embrace” (164).
“Half-hearted” captures my reservations about this project. Given
McEleney’s desire to embrace a
“pleasure unreconciled to virtue,”
I would have liked even more
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pleasure in this book. The book’s
insistent critical framing feels disciplinary, especially when it criticizes
other critics for being insufficiently
attuned to uselessness (e.g., 98–99). In
addition, the book sometimes fixes
rather than plays with binaries—for
example, in the coda’s bright-line
distinction between “conclusive criticism,” which is all about facts, information, and judgment, and a more
open-ended or speculative “implicative criticism,” which resists these in
order to engage readers (167). More
central to the aim of the book (and I
use that phrase with its full teleological meaning), the attempt to purify
pleasure from use risks limiting a
play between profit and pleasure—
as McEleney sometimes recognizes.
In addition, the book restricts
what counts as pleasure to that of
the text. Even sexual pleasure is
displaced by the textuality that figures it. But if we wish to escape the
Protestant work ethic (11) in order
give ourselves to pleasure, why
look to Renaissance literature?
Its pleasures are fairly difficult,
unlike, for example, the pleasure
of ice cream. That’s okay—I like
some of my pleasures that way.
Renaissance literature and, even

more, Renaissance literary scholarship, is an acquired taste, one that
simply by virtue of that literature’s
historical remove, to say nothing of
its rhetorical or literary historical
ambition, requires work to enjoy.
(And let’s not get started on writing about it.) To people who are
not readers or critics of Renaissance
literature, its pleasure is futile not
because there’s too much but too
little. It’s too much work! I expect
these readers would have the same
experience of Futile Pleasures,
which is hardly less workaday in
style or argument than most literary scholarship. If there’s a way to
make Renaissance literary scholarship more like sex or ice cream,
I do not think Futile Pleasures has
found it. The book is at its best
rather when it provides (I hope the
author won’t mind me saying so)
smart readings of Renaissance texts
that, to those of us who like this sort
of thing, are both useful and a pleasure to read.
Robert Matz is professor of English at
George Mason University. His most recent
book is an edition, Two Early Modern
Marriage Sermons: Henry Smith’s “A
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William Whately’s “A Bride-Bush” (1623).

